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1. Introduction 
Since the 1997 crisis, bond market development has become a high priority for policymakers in Asia. 
The development of local currency bond markets has been seen as a way to avoid crisis, with these 
markets helping to reduce potential currency and maturity mismatches in the financial system. Indeed, 
several Asian economies have succeeded in developing fairly active primary and secondary markets 
in local government bonds. 
Authorities across Asia have now turned their attention to local currency non-government bond 
markets, or what we might term “corporate bond” markets. They recognise that a robust financial 
system requires multiple channels of financing, in which banks and fixed income markets compete for 
borrowers. As the 1997 crisis itself demonstrated, short-term credit markets are prone to creditor runs, 
and a corporate bond market can provide the economy with an important backup form of 
intermediation.
1 
While primary markets for corporate bonds in Asia have grown significantly, the growth in some 
markets has been led by quasi-government issuers or issuers with some form of credit guarantee. This 
may have happened because investors have had little access to the kind of information that would 
allow them to adequately evaluate the credit risks of other potential issuers. The secondary markets 
have developed even less, with little trading activity to be seen. Such inactivity may stem from a lack 
of investor diversity, inadequate market microstructures and insufficient flows of timely information. 
In what follows, we first describe corporate bond markets in Asia and the Pacific in terms of their size 
and issuers. We then characterise the secondary markets and suggest reasons for the lack of liquidity 
in these markets. 
2.   Primary markets: size and issuers 
We rely on BIS statistics to characterise the size and composition of 12 markets for local currency 
corporate bonds in Asia and the Pacific. These markets are those of Australia, China, Hong Kong 
SAR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand. In this characterisation, “corporate bonds” are broadly defined to include all non-government 
long-term debt issues, including those by quasi-government issuers, financial and non-financial 
issuers and resident and non-resident issuers.
2 
2.1  Market size, liquidity thresholds and crowding out 
At the end of 2004, the 12 local currency markets featured in this paper had corporate bonds 
outstanding of over $2.9 trillion. The Japanese market alone is over $2 trillion in size, accounting for 
                                                       
1   In Greenspan’s (2000) words, a functioning capital market might have provided the Asian countries with a “spare tyre”, 
rendering the crisis more benign. Diamond (2004) shows formally why it is the nature of short-term credit markets to be 
prone to creditor runs. 
2   In Malaysia, this would be called the long-term part of the “private debt securities” (PDS) market.  
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two-thirds of the total (Table 1). Behind Japan are three markets that can still be considered rather 
large: Korea with $355 billion, China with $196 billion and Australia with $188 billion. These four 
markets are “large” in the sense that they exceed the $100 billion threshold McCauley and Remolona 
(2000) estimate would be required for a deep and liquid government bond market.
3 Because corporate 
bond issues tend to be more heterogeneous than government bond issues and their issue sizes 
smaller, such a threshold for corporate bond markets would likely be higher. Factors other than size 
that would affect liquidity are addressed in Section 3 below. 
 
Table 1 
Size of corporate bond markets and  
other channels of local currency funding 
Selected countries, end-2004 
Corporate bonds
1  Other channels as % of GDP 










Australia 187.5  27.1 185.4 111.5  13.8 
China 195.9  10.6  154.4 33.4 18.0 
Hong Kong SAR  61.9  35.8  148.9  547.7  5.0 
India 24.5  3.3  60.2 56.8 29.9 
Indonesia 6.8  2.4 42.6 24.5  15.2 
Japan 2,002.0  41.7 146.9  76.9  117.2 
Korea 355.6  49.3  104.2 74.7 23.7 
Malaysia 49.7  38.8 113.9 140.8  36.1 
New Zealand  29.9  27.8 245.5  41.1  19.9 
Philippines 0.2  0.2 49.8 37.5  21.8 
Singapore 21.7  18.6 70.1  211.4  27.6 
Thailand 31.9  18.3 84.9 67.1  18.5 
Memo: United States  15,116.6 128.8  89.0 138.4  42.5 
1Domestic and international bonds and notes in domestic currency issued by residents and non-residents. 
Sources: IMF; World Federation of Exchanges; Dealogic Bondware; national data; BIS 
 
Whatever the actual liquidity threshold, the remaining corporate bond markets would seem to have far 
to go to reach it. The next largest market is Hong Kong with $62 billion, followed by Malaysia with $50 
billion, Thailand with $32 billion, New Zealand with $30 billion and India and Singapore each with $22 
billion. Two other economies - Indonesia and the Philippines - have smaller markets. As discussed 
below, opening up to foreign issuers and investors may help a market overcome the disadvantages of 
a small size.  
The size of a market would depend not only on the size of the economy, but also on its level of 
development. In addition, market size would be affected by the competition among financing 
alternatives on either the issuer or investor side. While the banking sector or equity market would 
compete with the debt market for the same potential corporate issuers, the financing of heavy budget 
deficits may crowd out potential investors. Still, it is not surprising that the deepest corporate bond 
                                                       
3   This is, of course, only a rough threshold and does not take into account a number of factors that would affect liquidity.  
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markets are those of the higher-income economies of Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Hong Kong and 
Australia. In each of these cases, as shown in Table 1, the size of the market exceeds 25% of GDP. 
New Zealand and Singapore are notable exceptions in this regard: these are relatively well-developed 
economies with limited government borrowing needs, but both have relatively shallow corporate bond 
markets. In both cases, competing financing alternatives for potential issuers may be a key factor: 
New Zealand depends heavily on its banking sector and Singapore on its equity market. Indeed, the 
depth of the corporate bond markets of Hong Kong and Australia may be due in part to their relatively 
small government bond markets. 
2.2   Composition of issuers 
The types of issuers we find in a given market are a clue to how developed the market is. In a well-
developed market, any large firm should be able raise funds, because it will pay for investors to 
evaluate its credit quality on the basis of publicly available information. Hence, beyond the size of a 
market, a measure of its development would be the range of credit quality of the borrowers that come 
to the market. The presence of non-resident issuers may also represent a vote of confidence, 
indicating a market that is able to provide funds on terms that are competitive with those available in 
foreign credit markets. 
In Asia, issuers in some markets still seem to be concentrated at the high end of the credit quality 
spectrum. In Malaysia, about 40% of the market consists of issuers with the equivalent of triple-A 
ratings and another 40% the equivalent of double-A ratings.
4 In Korea, some 60% of the market is 
triple-A.
5 For more systematic data on the credit quality of issuers, we can turn to indirect evidence in 
the form of the division of issuers into quasi-government issuers and others. Quasi-government 
issuers are likely to borrow with government guarantees, whether explicit or implicit. Hence, they are 
likely to have the highest credit quality available in the country. As shown in Graph  1, quasi-
government issuers dominate three of the markets: China, India and New Zealand. These issuers also 
represent more than a third of the market in Indonesia and the Philippines. While financial institutions 
do dominate four other markets - Australia, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore - this is no different from 
the pattern in the more developed markets of Europe and the United States, and, at least in the case 
of Australia, most of the financial issues are in fact asset-backed securities (ABSs). 
Graph 1 
Types of issuers in 12 corporate bond markets 







AUD CNY  HKD  IDR INR JPY KRW MYR NZD PHP  SGD  THB 
Quasi-government 
Financials and ABS 
Corporate private 
 
Sources: Dealogic Bondware and BIS.  
                                                       
4   For purposes of comparison, the US market has its highest concentration of issuers in the single-A grade, followed by the 
triple-B grade. 
5   Nonetheless, it is notable that the Korean market has graduated from one dominated by issues backed by credit guarantees 
to one in which such issues are a negligible fraction.  
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In the markets dominated by highly rated issues, it is likely that institutional investors have internal 
guidelines that limit them to investing only in such securities. Such guidelines, however, may merely 
reflect a reality in which the public information available is not adequate for investors to assess the 
creditworthiness of most potential issuers. This possibility is suggested by Bhattacharya, Daouk and 
Welker (2003), who find that the opacity of earnings releases tends to be high in Asia. Fan and Wong 
(2002) argue that such releases in Asia tend to lack relevant information because of cross-holdings 
and pyramid ownership structures.  
 
Table 2 
Local currency corporate bonds by residence of issuer
1 
At end-2004 
  Residents 
(USD billions)  % of total  Non-residents 
(USD billions)  % of total 
Australia 134.0  71.5  53.5  28.5 
China 195.9  100.0  0.0  0.0 
Hong Kong SAR  27.3  44.1  34.6  55.9 
India 24.5  100.0  0.0  0.0 
Indonesia 6.8  99.8 0.0  0.2 
Japan 1,646.1  82.2 355.9 17.8 
Korea 355.2  99.9  0.4  0.1 
Malaysia 49.5  99.6  0.2  0.4 
New Zealand  4.1  13.8  25.8  86.2 
Philippines 0.2  86.8  0.0  13.2 
Singapore 13.9  64.0  7.8  36.0 
Thailand 31.8  99.8  0.1  0.2 
United States  13,535.9 89.5  1,580.7 10.5 
1Domestic and international bonds and notes in domestic currency issued by residents and non-residents 
Sources: Dealogic Bondware and BIS. 
 
As discussed earlier, the presence of foreign issuers may indicate how well-developed a market is, but 
may also reflect the efforts of policymakers in a small economy to find ways to enlarge their market, 
thereby making it more viable. As shown in Table 2, New Zealand, Hong Kong and Singapore host the 
highest proportions of non-resident issuers, with these issuers comprising 86%, 56% and 36% of 
these markets, respectively. Australia also has a relatively high proportion of 29%. By this metric, 
these four markets may be the best-developed ones in the region. 
3.  Secondary markets: reasons for illiquidity 
The secondary markets for local currency corporate bonds in Asia have lagged far behind their 
government bond counterparts. While government bond markets have become reasonably liquid over 
the past few years, corporate bond markets remain illiquid. As shown in Graph 2, the turnover ratios 
for Asian corporate bond markets are typically a small fraction of those for their government bond 
counterparts. Liquidity differences of this magnitude are to be expected, because, as mentioned  
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before, corporate issues tend to be more heterogeneous and smaller in size than government bond 
issues.
6  
Nonetheless, turnover ratios for corporate bonds in Asia indicate low levels of liquidity. The most 
notable exception in this regard is the Australian market, which has a turnover ratio higher than that of 
the US market. 
Four salient factors appear to be keeping liquidity low in the Asian markets: a) a lack of diversity in the 
investor base; b) inadequate market microstructures; c) market opaqueness; and d) a limited flow of 
timely information about issuers. We discuss each of these factors below.  
3.1  Diversity of investor base 
A diversity of investors fosters trading activity. With such diversity, it becomes less likely that different 
investors will find themselves on the same side of the market, either as sellers or buyers. They are 
more likely to disagree on the credit quality of an issuer, and thus more willing to trade, and less likely 
to need liquidity at the same time. In Asia, such diversity seems to be rather limited: the investor base 
for corporate bonds tends to be dominated by government-controlled provident funds, insurance 
companies and banks. Once a bond is issued, it normally disappears into the portfolios of buy-and-
hold investors. Those who might trade more actively, such as fixed income funds and hedge funds, 
are typically missing from these markets or are not allowed exposures in credit risk. 
An important class of investor missing from some Asian markets is foreign investors, including global 
financial intermediaries. In general, myriad market impediments discourage them from participating in 
the local markets. Among the impediments are withholding taxes and the lack of deep markets for 















Sources: Bank of Korea; Bank Negara Malaysia; Bank of Thailand; Reserve Bank of Australia, Bond Market Association of 
the US; Japan Securities Dealer Association; Australian Financial Markets Association; NSE India.  
 
                                                       
6   This difference is evident in bid-ask spreads for US markets. Fleming and Remolona (1999) calculate the bid-ask spread for 
on-the-run Treasury securities to be between a sixth and a third of a basis point on the yield. Chakravarty and Sarkar (2004) 
estimate the average bid-ask spread for corporates to be about 21 cents per $100. For a five-year bond, this amounts to 
about 4 basis points on the yield.  
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though. In setting up the Asian Bond Fund 2 (ABF2), as Ma and Remolona (2005) explain, central 
banks in Asia have been able to alleviate some of this. The Philippines, for example, recently removed 
documentary stamp taxes in the secondary trading of fixed income securities, which had discouraged 
foreign investors from participating in its local market. 
3.2 Market  microstructure 
Fixed-income debt securities tend to trade more actively on over-the-counter (OTC) markets than on 
exchanges.
7 The most liquid OTC markets are those for government securities, which tend to rely on 
designated market-makers (Sundaresan, 2002), as well as on inter-dealer brokers who allow dealers 
to trade with each other anonymously. Such microstructures have often required the intervention of 
governments to encourage market participants to set them up. Indeed, in most Asian markets primary 
dealers for government securities have been appointed and are required to make markets for these 
securities. Corporate bonds, however, have not had the benefit of such government-supported 
microstructures. As shown in Table 3, while most corporate issues in Asia do trade on OTC markets, 
they still lack liquidity. 
 
Table 3 
Secondary corporate bond markets 






Australia OTC/Exchange    2-10  … 
China OTC/Exchange  …  5-10  … 
Hong Kong SAR  OTC  50-100m  10-15  … 
India OTC/Exchange  50m  …  … 
Indonesia OTC  …  …  … 
Japan OTC  …    … 
Korea OTC/Exchange  10bn  2-5  Yes  (KSDA) 
Malaysia  OTC  5m  5-10   Yes (BIDS) 
New Zealand  OTC  …  5-15  … 
Philippines OTC  25-50m  Varies  … 
Singapore OTC  1-5m  10-15  … 
Thailand  OTC/Exchange  10-40m  5-10  Yes (ThaiBMA)  
Sources: Bloomberg, Citigroup (2005), and informal discussions with market participants. 
 
In Asia, efforts to foster liquidity in corporate bonds have included having them listed on existing stock 
exchanges or even the setting up of exchanges devoted to fixed income securities. So far these efforts 
have not borne fruit. In Seoul, for instance, over 90% of the secondary trading in corporate bonds still 
takes place in the OTC market and only 10% on the exchange, even with the mandatory requirement 
that the trading of on-the-run benchmark government bonds among primary dealers must take place at 
the exchange market. In Thailand, the turnover ratio has been 30% in the OTC market and only 1% on 
the local exchange. China presents an interesting case: because of regulatory fragmentation, financial 
issues have been traded only in the local interbank OTC market, while non-financial names have been 
traded either on the two domestic stock exchanges or in the interbank OTC market. 
                                                       
7    In the market microstructure literature, OTC markets are said to be “quote-driven” markets requiring dealers willing to 
maintain inventories, while exchanges are often “order-driven” markets requiring a continuous flow of buy and sell orders.  
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In the OTC markets, there tends to be one, or at most two, dealers for a single issue, who usually are 
the lead underwriters of that issue. Indicative quotes from dealers are sometimes available on 
Bloomberg, but, for the most part, ex ante transparency consists of dealers faxing quote sheets to 
potential investors. In most Asian markets, different dealers fax only a limited and often non-
comparable subset of the names in the rather heterogeneous corporate universe. There is no 
evidence of any formal inter-dealer market or of inter-dealer brokers who specialise in corporate 
bonds. Thus, the secondary market for corporate bonds tends to be uncompetitive, resulting in wide 
bid-ask spreads that discourage trading. Market participants suggest that bid-ask spreads are about 
five to ten basis points, even for the most liquid issues (Table 3). 
3.3 Market  opaqueness 
A third and related factor affecting liquidity is transparency of trading activity. Ex post transparency 
encourages competitive pricing and makes investors confident that they are getting good prices, as 
demonstrated by the recent experience of the US corporate bond market. Until about a few years ago, 
trading in US corporate bonds had been lacklustre. Since July 2002, however, dealers in corporate 
bonds have been required to report all OTC trades to the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine 
(TRACE) of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). TRACE disseminates reported 
prices within 15 minutes of a trade.
8 The introduction of such ex post transparency seems to have had 
a significant impact on liquidity. Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2005), for example, find that such 
transparency has reduced bid-ask spreads by five basis points. 
In recent years, some Asian markets have started to enact reporting requirements similar to or even 
surpassing those of TRACE. Much of this transparency, however, has been limited to transactions 
among dealers. Malaysia has the Bond Information Dissemination System (BIDS), in which dealers 
are required to enter trades (price and volume information) into the system within 10 minutes of a 
trade. This information then becomes available to the BIDS screen subscribers, which tend to be the 
participants on the “sell” side of the market. At least for those with access to BIDS, this system seems 
to provide better ex post transparency than even TRACE. The Thai Bond Market Association 
(ThaiBMA) requires traders to report OTC trades within 30 minutes and distributes the trade 
information to members four times a day. The Korea Security Dealers Association (KSDA) requires 
dealers to report their transactions within 15 minutes via its information distribution system, which 
disseminates the information to the public on a website on the same day. Even greater ex post 
transparency may be required if markets are to become more liquid. 
3.4 Flow  of  timely  information 
The fourth limiting factor is perhaps the most critical one. Corporate bond markets in Asia seem to 
have a very limited flow of timely information about issuers. In markets such as those for corporate 
bonds, much liquidity can be generated by the activity of investors who disagree about fundamentals. 
Such information-based trading provides spillover benefits to those who are in the market for purely 
liquidity reasons. Moreover, such trading tends to be active when there is a significant flow of 
information about the credit quality of issuers, with every new piece of information creating a new 
reason to disagree. 
In the more developed markets of Europe and North America, the flow of market-relevant news takes 
various forms. Issuers themselves provide quarterly financial reports and profit warnings; the financial 
press and information services report on major deals and transactions and important corporate events; 
and credit rating agencies make various announcements about changes in their views on rated 
companies. Trading in corporate bonds tends to pick up around these information events. 
The market reactions to the various rating agency announcements illustrate the importance of timely 
information. Rating agencies have chosen to be very careful and deliberate about changing credit 
ratings, and hence rating changes tend to significantly lag the arrival of the relevant information in the 
markets. In their effort to be timely, rating agencies have devised “review” announcements - 
                                                       
8   The majority of trades are transparent as soon as they are reported.  
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“Watchlist” in the case of Moody’s and “CreditWatch” in the case of Standard and Poor’s. These 
announcements are made as soon as significant information is released, and they signal the possibility 
of a rating change within a few months. Micu, Remolona and Wooldridge (2004) have documented 
that market reactions to rating agency moves are strongest for these review announcements. 
Asian markets typically do not see such information flows. Many issues carry one form of government 
guarantee or another, making the credit quality of the issuer irrelevant. The guarantees, of course, 
rarely change, giving investors no reason to disagree and therefore no reason to trade. When issuers 
do release information, even with common law sources of accounting standards, Ball, Robin and Wu 
(2003) find a pattern in which financial reporting in some Asian markets tends not to recognise 
economic losses in a timely way. Local credit rating agencies do exist in Asia, and often ratings are 
mandatory for bond issues. Most such rating agencies, however, are quite new and have not 
developed the reputation that will allow investors to trust their judgments on all but the largest and 
most highly rated names. 
4. Conclusion 
In their effort to develop their local currency corporate bond markets, policymakers in some Asian 
countries face fundamental questions. In the case of primary markets, should they emphasise further 
growth even if issuance remains concentrated in quasi-government issuers and those with explicit or 
implicit credit guarantees? Or should they focus their efforts on disclosure rules, accounting standards 
and transparency so that investors can get the information they need for assessing credit risk for a 
broader range of potential issuers? While concentrating on the first goal may be a good way to start, is 
it time to develop a culture of credit assessment and pricing of credit risk? 
In the case of the secondary markets, the policy questions have to do with whether to focus on 
developing market microstructure, on diversifying the investor base or strengthening the institutions 
that foster flows of market-relevant information. These approaches are not necessarily substitutes and 
may be pursued together for greater effectiveness. In practice, however, developing market 
structures - for example, setting up fixed income exchanges - appears to be the most straightforward 
approach, while the others appear more complex and their pay-offs longer-term. Nonetheless, 
diversifying the investor base and improving the flow of market-relevant information are perhaps more 
important in the long run.  
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